For a generation, the small-cap premium was the closest thing empirical finance had to a free lunch on the syllabus: small companies, over long samples, appeared to return more than their risk seemed to warrant. I taught it for years. Then, roughly when everyone had learned to order it, it stopped arriving — and the argument about why has become more instructive than the premium ever was. [author assertion]
The first interpretation is that the premium was real, and being known killed it. Publication is a tax on anomalies. Once an effect is in the textbooks, in the products, in the mandates of every fund with "small-cap tilt" in its name, capital crowds into the trade until the excess return is competed down to the cost of harvesting it. On this reading, the premium did not fail. It succeeded, publicly, and success was fatal. [author assertion]
The second interpretation is less flattering to my profession: the premium was substantially mismeasured. In the samples I have examined, the effect concentrates in the smallest and least liquid names — stocks that are cheap to count in a database and expensive to actually own — and in particular corners of the calendar. The tradable version of the premium was always thinner than the paper version, and a good deal of what my generation taught as a return was, in part, a measurement of the gap between database prices and executable ones. [author assertion]
The third interpretation is that size was never the point. Small firms are exposed — to credit conditions, to local economies, to the refinancing calendar — in ways that the standard risk models capture imperfectly. What looked like a premium for smallness may have been compensation for risks the models omit, which would explain both why it appeared and why it does not sit still to be harvested: the compensation varies with the very conditions that make it necessary. [author assertion]
A word, too, about the calendar, since students always ask. Effects in equity markets have a habit of living in particular months and dying in others, and the small-cap story was never innocent of this. When a premium can only be found by those willing to rebalance into illiquidity at the most congested moment of the year, one should ask whether the premium is a return to size — or a return to showing up, with cash, when showing up is hardest. The two hypotheses have identical charts and very different morals. [author assertion]
My retired verdict is that all three are true, in proportions we will never estimate cleanly, because the data-generating process refuses to hold still while we estimate it. Markets learn, rules change, the composition of "small" changes. We are fitting lines through the wake of a moving ship and arguing about the ship. [author assertion]
Which is the general lesson I would leave with students, and it extends well beyond this one anomaly. Every empirical regularity in finance is a photograph of a market at a particular moment in its institutional development. Expect decay as the pattern becomes known. Expect measurement to flatter the pattern. And do not build a retirement — or a syllabus — on the assumption that either force will politely refrain. [author assertion]
