I taught the efficient market hypothesis when it was young, and so was I, and for the first decade of my career I taught it the way one teaches a theorem — as something close to settled. Four decades of students and markets have edited my views far more than any journal article did. This is a brief account of the edits, offered by a retired professor who no longer has a syllabus to defend. [author assertion]
The largest edit is a distinction I failed to make for years. That prices are hard to beat is an empirical regularity with a great deal of evidence behind it. That prices are right is a much stronger claim — a metaphysics I smuggled into my lectures inside the first claim's luggage. A market can be brutally difficult to outsmart and still be, at any given moment, quite wrong about value. Students who grasp the difference have learned the most useful thing my course had to teach, and I was embarrassingly late to teach it on purpose. [author assertion]
The evidence, across my teaching lifetime, pushed in a consistent direction. Patterns that should not exist under the strong form of the hypothesis kept being documented; episodes of collective enthusiasm and despair kept recurring with a regularity that embarrassed the word "anomaly". My considered view now is that markets are excellent aggregators of information and enthusiastic amplifiers of mood — frequently in the same week, occasionally in the same afternoon. Both halves of that sentence deserve equal billing, and for years my lectures gave the second half about ten minutes in November. [author assertion]
The best students, I noticed, eventually stopped asking whether the market is efficient. They asked a better question: efficient at what, for whom, and over what horizon? A market can incorporate public information into prices with terrifying speed while allocating capital across decades with all the foresight of weather. The hypothesis survives the question, but it survives as a tool with a specified use, not as a worldview. [author assertion]
The hypothesis's most durable product, in my judgement, is not a theory of value at all. It is the case for humility in stock-picking — and its monument is the index fund. More wealth has been protected by that one piece of applied scepticism than by every active strategy my students went on to sell. There is a sermon in that, and near the end of my career I stopped resisting preaching it. [author assertion]
What do I still defend? The hypothesis as a null and as a discipline. Assume the price knows something you do not. Put the burden of proof on whoever claims otherwise — including, especially, on yourself at the moment a trade feels obvious. That posture has saved more investors than any model I ever put on a board. [author assertion]
I now grade the efficient market hypothesis the way I used to grade students: wrong in interesting ways, careless about its own limits, and the source of more good questions than any rival in the room. That is higher praise than it sounds like, coming from a man who spent forty years marking. [author assertion]
