Every institution I have advised runs stress tests, and most run them well: serious scenarios, honest numbers, a committee that reads the results with appropriate gravity. And yet I have come to distrust the drill, for a reason that took me years to say plainly. A stress test rehearses the institution's *arithmetic*. A crisis tests its *behaviour* — who may decide, how fast, on what information, and against whose objections. The drill almost never rehearses the second list, because the second list is embarrassing to write down. [author assertion]
Watch what a real funding stress actually consumes. It does not consume capital first; it consumes *permission*. The treasurer knows what to do and cannot do it until a committee that meets on Thursdays agrees it is Thursday. The collateral is available and the person who can release it is on a plane. The scenario in the drill assumed a decision-maker the way a recipe assumes a cook. Fires are not interested in our assumptions, and neither, in my experience, are crises. [author assertion]
The drill has a second, quieter defect: it trains the wrong confidence. A test the institution passes every year, on scenarios the institution wrote, graded by the institution, becomes evidence of safety in the precise way a model becomes trusted — smoothly, plausibly, month after month. The scenario team and the risk committee read the same newspapers, fear the same recent crisis, and exclude the same unthinkable one. Every drill I have ever seen was, in part, a rehearsal for the *previous* fire, conducted by people whose careers the previous fire had already edited. [author assertion]
None of this is an argument against testing. It is an argument about what the test is *of*. I now advise treasuries to run two drills, not one. The first is the arithmetic one they already run. The second takes the same scenario and removes, on the morning of the exercise, two names chosen at random from the decision chain, one system, and the assumption that the first call will be answered. What breaks then is never the funding plan. It is the choreography — and choreography, unlike capital, can be repaired in peacetime for almost nothing. [author assertion]
The deeper point is the one underneath all my work: a drill, like a model, is an opinion with an org chart, and passing it feels like a verdict when it is only ever a rehearsal. Institutions should hold their passing grades the way sailors hold a forecast — gratefully, and with a hand on the rail. The question I leave with any committee that has just passed its annual test is the one I would want asked of me: your drill assumed a decision-maker, a working phone tree, and a borrower of last resort's patience. Which of those three have you actually *met* — and which have you only ever read about in the scenario document? [author assertion]
